NGO
Another Way (Stichting Bakens Verzet), 1018 AM
SELF-FINANCING, ECOLOGICAL, SUSTAINABLE,
LOCAL INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS FOR THE WORLD’S POOR
Edition 03: 26 March, 2009
(CLIQUEZ ICI POUR LA VERSION
EN FRANÇAIS)
“Poverty is created scarcity”
Wahu Kaara, point 8 of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty, 58th
annual NGO Conference, United Nations,
08.60 How the
project seeks to combat corruption.
08.60.01
Introduction.
This project is intended to be corruption-free. The purpose of this
section 08.60 of the project is to describe features built into the project
structures to combat corruption. Although most people in the project area
generally agree on what corruption is, delicate border-line situations of
privilege linked to widely accepted traditional tribal practices can arise.
Project structures need to be created to handle these situations on a case by
case basis. Although the project structures set up during project execution
operate independently of both the formal political and administrative
structures on the one hand and of the traditional local tribal structures on
the other, the all have to be complementary to and work in harmony with them.
Permanent conflict would unnecessarily complicate project execution.
The following aspects are taken in turn:
On-going project monitoring.
Project audit provisions.
Support of traditional tribal structures for the project.
Support of formal political and administrative structures for the
project.
Social control through project structures and the leading role reserved
for women.
Some risks taken into account.
Detecting corruption and encouragement
for and protection of whistle blowers.
Structures for the handling of complaints.
08.60.10 On-going
Project Monitoring.
Since the project area covers quite a small surface area and the whole
population there participates in the project, measurement and monitoring of the
results of the various project activities is relatively simple. The results of
most project activities are physical and visible to all. Use made of the
various project structures is systematically registered and monitored on a day
to day basis as a standard part of their operation. Most operations can
therefore be checked in real time.
08.60.20 Project
audit and protection of investors’ interests.
Details on auditing
structures are set out in section 4.20 Auditing structures. The project
documentation includes a diagram of the project’s auditing structures. Two levels of audit
are provided for. The first is a permanent detailed on-going independent audit
structure carried out on behalf of the NGO responsible for supervising project
execution. The audit committee is independent of project execution. Its members
may be members of the Board of Directors of the NGO responsible for supervision
of project execution, and/or external experts. The second level is a traditional periodic external audit.
Auditors at both levels have full investigative powers and can carry out
inspections on site and of all documentation without prior notice.
Project execution passes
through a series of logical steps in the creation of the project structures.
First the social structures are created, then the financial structures, then
the productive structures, and finally the service structures. Exposure of investors at any one point of
project execution is limited. Work on next following structures does not take
place until the preceding structures are in place and in operation.
The new capital content of project structures
tends to increase with progress in project execution. The first (the social and
financial) structures to be set up have relatively low formal money capital
content. The second (the productive) structures have an intermediate level of
capital content. The last (the service) structures, and especially the
distributed drinking water structures, have the highest level of capital
content. By the time the service structures are to be installed, most of the
work on them can be done under the local money system, operational costs and
formal money reserves for maintenance and long-term replacement are already
being collected, and local production of
items necessary for the service structures is already under way. For more details see section 07.14
Built-in protection for financing parties.
08.60.30 Support by
traditional tribal structures for the project.
08.60.40 Support by
formal political and administrative structures for the project.
08.60.50 Social
control through the project structures.
Three-tiered elected social structures are set up at an early phase of
project execution. These form the pillars of the various financial and services
structures created in later project phases. They are designed to ensure tight
social control over all activities at all levels.
The first level is the tank
commission level, representing about 40 families.
The second level is the
well commission, representing about 250 families.
The third level is the central
commission, representing 10.000 families.
View:
Anthropological
justification of the social structures.
Schematic drawing of the project area.
Illustration of the project management lines.
The development of social groupings of humans, in particular over the
last 11.000 years is used as the basis for the choice of administrative levels
for project applications under the Model.
Description of the
tank commission level :
About 11.000 years ago, nomadic bands of dozens of hunter-gatherers
(mostly defined as “extended families” or “clans”) started producing food and
forming village groups. (Diamond J., Guns, germs, and steel, Vintage,
London, 1998). Diamond refers to the
village groups as “tribes” comprising several extended families with an upper
limit of “a few hundred” where “everyone knows everyone else by name and
relationships” (Ibid. p.271). Prof. Robin Dunbar of
Each tank commission serves about 40 families or 200 people.
Description of the
well commission level:
The second, or intermediate,
administrative level provided for in the Model is the well commission. It can also be called an area development commission.
The well commissions are the equivalent of Jared Diamond’s “chiefdoms” with
“several thousand” inhabitants where “for any person [living there] the vast
majority of other people…. were neither closely related by blood or marriage nor known by name.”
(op.cit. p.273). They developed some 7500 years ago as a result of higher
population densities made possible by the local cultivation of food. Leadership
institutions (“chiefdoms”) are believed to have evolved to create ways of
resolving conflicts naturally arising amongst inhabitants not directly bound to
each other by blood or marriage. Of special interest to integrated development
projects in the modern world is that the first systems for the collection and
re-distribution of wealth and the first forms of division of labour were
established in this phase. “The most distinctive economic features of chiefdoms
was their shift from reliance solely on the reciprocal exchanges
characteristics of bands and tribes……..[to] an additional new system termed a redistributive
economy.” (op.cit. p.275). The well commissions provided for in the Model
typically represent about 1500-2000 inhabitants. This population base supports
some modern essential services, too. A typical working area for general
practitioners in industrialised countries is 1 doctor to 2000 inhabitants. In
the
Description of the central commission level:
The third, or project level
administrative structure provided in the Model represents all (50.000)
inhabitants living in a given project area. Jared Diamond refers to this level
as “states”, with “over
08.60.60 Women play a leading
role at all levels:
The 40 families
served by a tank commission elect the 3-7 members of the tank commission.
Before the first election, women’s health clubs have been set up in each tank
commission area. The health clubs serve as a platform for women, so that they
can organise themselves and vote en bloc at the tank commission elections. The
result is that most, if not all, of the members of each tank commission will be
women.
Each tank
commission nominates one member to the well-commission serving it. Since a
majority, if not all, of the tank commission members will be women, it is
expected they will nominate a woman to the well commission, so that most, if
not all, of the members of the well
commission will be women.
Each well
commission nominates one member to the central commission, or project
parliament.. Since a majority, if not all, of the well commission members will
be women, it is expected they will nominate a woman to the central commission,.
so that most, if not all, of the members
of the central commission will be women.
08.60.70 Some factors taken into account.
The following table makes use, with the kind consent
of the copyright owner, of material from attachment 09.53 Need and greed: corruption risks, perceptions
and prevention in humanitarian
assistance HPG Policy Brief 32, ODI Overseas Development Institute,
Some of the high risk areas mentioned are not always
applicable to cooperative integrated projects, like this one, where all members
of the population participate in all project structures and all project
activities. All project structures and services are by definition
non-selective. Most project activities take place under close social scrutiny
and control.
Activity
group |
High
risk areas |
Corruption
risk examples |
|
|
|
Assistance
process |
|
|
|
Assessment |
Incorrect information provided to direct assistance
to certain households, groups or regions, or to inflate needs. |
|
Registration |
Names added to beneficiary lists in exchange for payment
or sexual favours; bribes demanded; multiple registrations. |
|
Targeting |
Leaders/staff/committees provide false information
about which households meet targeting criteria. |
|
Distribution |
Distributors modify ration amounts or composition,
or knowingly distribute commodities to "ghost" or to
non-beneficiaries. |
Sector |
|
|
|
Food aid |
Manipulation or bribery in assessments, registration
and targeting; diversion and sale during transport or storage; skimming
rations. |
|
High-value items e.g. medicines |
Manipulation or bribery in assessments, registration
and targeting; diversion and sale during transport or storage; substandard
goods; manipulation of statistics. |
|
Construction |
Intentional use of substandard materials,
manipulation of land titles. |
Programme
support |
|
|
|
Procurement |
Collusion, kickbacks, multiple submission of same
invoice, conflicts of interest, forging transactions, manipulation of
statistics. |
|
Human resources |
"Ghost" staff, nepotism. |
|
Finance |
Falsified or inflated invoices or receipts or
transactions, manipulation of exchange rates, abuse of bank accounts,
embezzlement, manipulation of statistics. |
|
Fleet management |
Unauthorised private use of vehicles, siphoning off
fuel, collusion with fuel/service providers, falsified records. |
|
Logistics |
Falsification of warehouse documents, diversion
during transport. |
Engagement
modality |
|
|
|
Partnership arrangements |
Partners can engage in any of the above corruption
areas. |
|
Scaling up local offices for direct delivery |
Human resources recruitment and other programme
support risks; bribes required for permits or access to public services. |
|
Working through committees |
Diversion of assistance to their own networks
including family members and friends, acceptance of bribes for inclusion on
lists. |
|
Working through local leadership structures / local
government |
Diversion of assistance to their own networks and
political supporters, acceptance of bribes for inclusion on lists; undue
influence of local elites. |
08.60.80 Detecting
corruption and encouragement for and protection
of whistle blowers.
Within some traditional social systems, some community members may not
wish to report cases of possible abuse of privilege by their social seniors. As
already stated in section 08.60.10 , abuse of privilege may in some cases
even be socially tolerated. In those circumstances, potential whistle-blowers
may be reluctant to report abuse, or even afraid of doing so. They need to be
convinced their complaints will be taken seriously. It is not enough to declare
a policy of zero tolerance with regard to corruption. The people in the project
area need to be clearly informed what the project considers to be corruption.
Community leaders will be expected to underwrite both the anti-corruption
policy itself and the definition given to corruption. Since the project is
co-operative in nature, privilege for one person usually means a lowering of
priorities and/or benefits for other members of the community.
With a view to the contents of the table in section 08.60.70, and taking
into account the elements favouring powerful social control in the project
area, people will be asked to watch out in particular for cases of abuse of
privilege in general, unjust exclusion from or inclusion in services, cases
where community members are asked or forced to pay bribes, cases of extortion,
requests for sexual favours in exchange for services, forced sharing of project
benefits, and substandard workmanship.
08.60.90 Structures
for the handling of complaints.
As project structures are formed and become operative, responsibility for
their on-going management and maintenance is passed over to the permanent
Project Management Cooperative. All people in the project area are members of
the Cooperative. They elect Tank Commission members, who appoint Well
Commission members, who appoint the members to the Central Committee, which
appoints a small project Management Team.
Settlement of conflicts arising during on-going management of the project
structures is one of the express tasks
of the Central Committee of the Project Management Cooperative. The Central Committee for each project must
decide how it will do this. It is expected the Central Committee will usually
choose to set a Claims Review Committee up. The members of the Claims Review
Committee comprise Central Committee members only or members entirely
independent of the project (therefore external to the project area) or a
combination of these. The Claims Review Committee answers exclusively to the
Central Committee. It is independent of Project Management, whose members may
not be members of the Claims Review Committee.
Settlement of conflicts arising during project execution and before
passage of project structures to the Project Management Cooperative, is the
task of the Board of Directors of the Project NGO set up to supervise project
execution. The Project NGO is the project parliament during execution. It
controls the operation of the independent
project coordinator and his team (the project government). The Board of Directors of each project NGO
must decide how it will organise the settlement of conflicts. It may itself to
act as the Claims Review Committee. It may decide to include these duties in
its instructions to the independent on-going auditing committee. Or it may
nominate a Claims Review Committee with members entirely independent of the
project and therefore external to the project area. It is independent of the
Project Coordinator and his team, whose members may not be members of the
Claims Review Committee.
NEW HORIZONS FOR DEVELOPMENT: SOME SHORT
POWERPOINT PRESENTATIONS
MORE ON SOME BASIC ISSUES COVERED BY THE MODEL:
Next file : 09.10 List of annexes.
Back : 08.50 How the projects meets
millennium goals in the project area.
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